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BUSINESS PARTICIPATION TO GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: 
CHALLENGING THEORY WITH EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
Amandine Bled1 
 
 
Abstract 
This article aims at questioning the way business representatives organise when 
confronted to the development of international environmental regulations. The 
negotiations of the Convention on biodiversity (CBD) are investigated as a case study. 
After examining the existing literature on business involvement in international 
biodiversity governance, the article elaborates on a database of business participation to 
CBD negotiations. The main aim, while using such a database, is to clarify theoretical 
hypotheses on business participation to environmental regimes as well as to propose 
new directions for further research on business actors in environmental governance. The 
first results from this quantitative assessment are discussed and complemented with 
qualitative data from the literature as well as a series of interviews and participatory 
observations. The article sheds some light on current trends in the participation of 
industries to international biodiversity policy-making. In particular, business actors are 
much more diversified than theoretical frameworks supposed them to be. The handful of 
individuals that initially represented business in biodiversity governance is nowadays 
being slowly replaced by a broader range of economic actors advocating new solutions 
for sustainable development. These actors act through national delegations as well as 
direct participation to the negotiations through individual firms or business coalitions. 
In order to take the diversity of business actors into account, the research calls for the 
development of more precise empirical assessments of business actors in environmental 
governance.      
 
Keywords: International Environmental Negotiations; Global Biodiversity Governance; 
Business Participation. 
 
Resumo 
 
Após revisar a literatura existente sobre a participação de atores empresariais na 
governança internacional da biodiversidade, este artigo elabora uma base de dados 
sobre a participação desses atores durante as negociações da Convenção da 
Biodiversidade (CBD). Os resultados desta avaliação quantitativa são discutidos e 
complementados com dados qualitativos obtidos através de entrevistas e observações 
participantes. O objetivo principal é apresentar desafios teóricos e novos 
direcionamentos para futuras pesquisas sobre a participação do mundo dos negócios nos 
regimes ambientais internacionais. 
 
Palavras-chave: Governança Ambiental Global; Biodiversidade; Participação de 
Atores Empresariais. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR BIODIVERSITY 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The issue of the privatisation of governance is at the core of current studies in 
International Relations (IR) in general and environmental studies in particular. The 
concerns linked to the multiplication of private actors –Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGO), business actors, indigenous organisations- in a formerly state 
centred world system are indeed of great importance. However, while the role of 
environmental NGOs has been at the centre of environmental governance studies (see 
among others Princen & Finger, 1994 ; Arts, 1998 ; Corell, 1999 ; Breitmeier & 
Rittberger, 2000 ; Corell & Betsill, 2001 ; Arts & Mack, 2003), business actors have 
been somehow neglected  by this same line of research (Levy & Newell, 2005; Falkner, 
2008).  
Though, private sector actors’ participation in environmental governance is of 
particular interest. On the one hand, there is a risk to see environmental regulations 
being bypassed by “business as usual” practices that might end up in “greenwashing”; 
on the other hand, private sector actors seem more and more to be part of the solution 
towards sustainable development through they involvement in environmental goals’ 
achievement and their technological skills. In order to further analyse the links between 
business and environmental governance, this article aims at understanding the 
importance and characteristics of business actor’s participation in international 
environmental negotiations. It takes the development of the biodiversity treaty adopted 
in 1992 under the United Nations Environment Program as an example.  
According to some authors, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has been 
“the first true sustainable development convention” (Le Prestre, 2002, p.1).  Initially it 
was meant to deal with the conservation of biological diversity, but the scope of the 
agreement indeed evolved to cover issues such as biotechnology, intellectual property 
rights or technology transfer. This evolution was not predicted by the initiators of the 
biodiversity treaty -the United States helped by a coalition of northern environmental 
NGOs. The American government indeed declared during the Earth Summit in 1992 
that the provisions of the biodiversity treaty had gone too far and had possible negative 
impacts on several international trade regimes. As a consequence, the American 
government, pushed by its industrial sectors concerned by the treaty, did not ratify the 
CDB. The status of the United States’ as a non Party to the Biodiversity Convention has 
not prevented American participants from following carefully the CBD negotiations. In 
particular, the CBD negotiated two issues that have particular potential impacts for 
business activities.  
In 2001, the Cartagena Protocol negotiated under the Convention has been the 
first international treaty to recognise the need for a precautionary approach to deal with 
the transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms. It has served as the 
basis for the elaboration of several national legislations on biosafety in countries such as 
Mexico, China or South Africa (Gupta & Falkner, 2006). These developments have had 
a strong impact on biotechnology companies, grain traders and food retailers (Andrée, 
2005).  
The second issue dealt under the biodiversity treaty concerns the current 
negotiations of an international regime to regulate the access to natural genetic 
resources. In 1992, the biodiversity Convention recognised the sovereignty of nation 
states over their natural resources and put an end to the former “common heritage 
principle” that before 1992 stated that genetic resources were free of access for any 
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users (Thomas, 2006). The rational for such a radical change in resources management 
was to try to redistribute part of the profits made from the commercialisation of genetic 
resources by-products –cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, seeds- to local and indigenous 
populations. In 2002, the Parties to the Convention decided that this objective had to be 
reinforced and adopted a mandate to establish a regime on Access and Benefit Sharing 
(ABS) by 2010. Pharmaceutical, nutraceutical, cosmetics or seed companies using 
biological resources as their raw material will be impacted by this new ABS scheme 
(Laird & Wynberg, 2008).  
The biodiversity treaty is no exemption to the research deficit we mentioned 
above on business participation to environmental regimes. When screening the literature 
on business and biodiversity, it appears that there is an overall lack of empirical 
analyses of economic actors in biodiversity governance. Interpretations mainly rely on 
structural deductive arguments presuming the way business is supposed to interact with 
biodiversity issues. Moreover, the literature often makes the methodological choice to 
focus on a limited number of business coalitions in order to picture the trends, positions 
and strategies of the entire business community. In the case of the biosafety negotiations, 
the Global Industry Coalition, an international business lobbying group, has been at the 
centre of academic studies (Andrée, 2005; Clapp, 2007; Buriel, 2007). This is even 
clearer when looking at the access and benefit sharing issue where the only business 
coalition mentioned in the literature has been the International Chamber of Commerce 
(Tully, 2003, p.84; Frein & Meyer, 2005, p.123), while many other individual 
companies and groups are taking part to the negotiations (Bled, 2009a).  
In order to fill this gap, this article aims at exposing the main results of an 
empirical assessment of business participation to biodiversity negotiations. This 
assessment is mostly based on quantitative data and proceeds as follows. The first part 
of the article questions the current theoretical frameworks that can help describing and 
explaining business participation to environmental regimes. While being relevant for 
understanding the particularities of business actors in environmental governance, these 
frameworks have important shortcomings. This leads us to propose an empirical 
assessment of business participation to the CBD negotiations. This assessment enables 
us to qualify former assumptions on business participation to environmental regimes as 
well as to propose several points for further research on the topic. 
2 FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: STUDYING BUSINESS 
INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 
a. Main theoretical approaches on business as an actor of 
environmental regimes 
 
A brief overview of former research on business power in IR and environmental 
governance helps us to understand the current elements at stake in the study of business 
as an actor in environmental negotiations. Former research has led to a better 
understanding of the components of business power at the international level as well as 
the nature of the political game business actors are evolving in. The structure/agency 
dilemma led to the development of two main theoretical approaches conceptualising the 
role of business actors in the policy-making processes. 
A pluralist interpretation was initially developed in lobbying studies at the 
national level, in particular following the American tradition (Falkner, 2008, p.22). 
According to this approach, actors’ interests are in competition to influence policy 
outcomes while no a priori dominance exists that can dictate power outcomes. Interests 
are indeterminate and evolve with time while their interactions shape the final policy 
results. This account favours relational power, a concept that refers to the Weberian 
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tradition and identifies power as outcomes. Therefore, it considers a positivist 
epistemology researching for evidences of power through causal relations. However, 
scholars soon realised that causality was not always a precise phenomena and that 
invisible dimensions of power could also impact international politics. Power could be 
exercised outside of the visible sphere.  
In the 1990s, International Political Economy (IPE) answered to the 
shortcomings of the pluralist assumptions by emphasizing on business structural power 
in world politics. This interpretation underlined the privileged relationship that business 
representatives had with policy-makers. By doing so, this account gave a deterministic 
view of international politics –as controlled by business interests– and privileged 
“structural power”, a notion developed by Lucks and theorized by Strange (1988, p.24). 
Structural power was meant to picture, in an intuitive way, the different invisible 
components of power, contained in economic, financial, knowledge and security 
capacities. Again, the approach faced some limits, one of the most important ones being 
the absence of clear evidences of influence.  
One of the main contributions of these two main approaches, and more 
particularly the structural one, has been to underline the importance of the material as 
well as ideational capacities of economic actors. Three main sources of power have 
indeed been identified by former research in order to explain firms’ impact on 
international relations: relational power, structural power and discursive power –a third 
dimension at the crossroads between the other two (Fuchs, 2007; Fuchs & Lederer, 
2007).  
However, these approaches have several shortcomings too. Mainly, by focusing 
on business skills and capacities, they tend to oversimplify the complexity of 
policymaking processes. Two recent trends in IR aim at balancing the pluralist and 
structural power perspectives, while integrating the three dimensions of business power: 
the neo-gramscian framework on the one hand and the business conflict school model 
on the other hand. Our next section is dedicated to these recent trends and develops their 
main assumptions on business actors’ participation in environmental negotiations. 
 
b. Recent developments: the neo-gramscian approach and neo-pluralist 
model 
The neo-gramscian approach to global environmental governance and the neo-
pluralist model both aim at synthesizing former research results on business power in 
environmental issues. These approaches can potentially help us to develop some 
hypotheses for our analysis of business actors in biodiversity negotiations. 
Taking the structural approach on business power as a starting point, the neo-
gramscian scholars centre they interpretation of international environmental politics on 
the notion of hegemony, defined as « […] the persistence of specific social and 
economic structures that systematically advantage certain groups » (Levy & Newell, 
2005, p.86). Hegemony relies on three pillars of power - economic, organisational and 
discursive-, that are successively and alternatively employed by the actors engaged in 
policy-making (Levy & Egan, 2003). According to neo-gramscian scholars this 
hegemony is currently embodied in transnational networks linking government officials 
with business actors and that advocate economic liberalisation to the detriment of 
environment standards.  
While recognizing the privileged position of economic actors in current 
governance trends, neo-gramscian scholars aim also at describing the complexity of 
international relations’ processes by describing the existence of countervailing forces to 
business interests, mainly NGOs and civil society (Levy & Newell, 2005). The 
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existence of a broad range of actors at the international level gives a contingent and 
contested nature to hegemony.  
For the neo-gramscian trend, business dominance is seen as the “conventional 
wisdom” in biodiversity negotiations. Industries are expected to have great resources in 
the three pillars –economic, organisational and discursive- of hegemony. The common 
interest of business actors, aiming at maximising their profits, is also a crucial factor in 
determining their ability to influence the policy-making process. Several studies using 
the neo-gramscian assumptions have been conducted on the Cartagena Protocol 
negotiations. In these negotiations, “the position taken by industry players in the 
biosafety case did not divide along regional or country lines. Rather, industry groups 
presented a fairly unified position in the talks” (Clapp, 2007). The organisational 
structure of business at the international level is therefore considered as highly 
integrated (Andrée, 2005).  
Regarding the influence of business actors on the negotiations, neo-gramscian 
scholars underline the fact that business actors have very close links with governmental 
officials. Neo-gramscian scholars indeed observe a phenomenon they call “revolving 
doors” and that describe the several changes in participants’ status over the course of 
international decision-making processes, especially between government and private 
sector representatives (Newell & Glover, 2003, p.13). Industry representatives are also 
meant to be integrated in national delegations to international negotiations. 
 
Taking the pluralist account as a starting point, the business conflict school 
model –also labelled as neo-pluralism- tends to bring some elements of pluralism back 
in the business power debate, while recognising the diversity of business interests at the 
international level. It considers three potential divides between (i) international and 
national firms; (ii) technological leaders and technological laggards; (iii) firms 
operating at the beginning or at the end of the production chain (Falkner, 2008). These 
divides have consequences on the ability of business actors to organise at the 
international level and limit their influence on policy-making. 
The business conflict school model therefore recognises a greater diversity of the 
business interests represented at the international level. Applied to the issue of biosafety, 
the business conflict school model signals that the so-called “business community” 
gathers a broad range of business sectors (Falkner, 2008, pp.32-35). Concerning the 
influence of these actors on international negotiation processes, the business conflict 
model recognises that private sector actors can act through national delegations –that 
will pursue different goals- as well as directly –through lobbying coalitions.  
While giving us relevant elements on business power at the international level, 
the neo-gramscian and business conflict school models are still rather general on the 
modalities of business participation to environmental regimes. We argue in the next 
section that this lack of detail can be explained by their disregard of the micro-processes 
at stake for business participation to environmental governance. These interpretations 
indeed favour structural deductive argumentations. We underline in the next section the 
empirical elements that will be further studied in order to complement current 
assumptions on business participation to environmental regimes. 
 
 
c. Testing theoretical claims with quantitative data 
The neo-gramscian and business conflict school models present some common 
research questions that could be used to scrutinize more precisely business participation 
in the biodiversity treaty. 
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First of all, they both consider the issue of business representation at the 
international level of policy-making.  This point comprises the importance of business 
participation –i.e. the number of business representatives attending the negotiations- as 
well as the industrial sectors represented. Neo-gramscian scholars would expect a few 
number of industry representatives to participate at the international level of policy-
making as business overall dominance at the international level renders any direct 
action unnecessary. According to these scholars, such data would have to be confronted 
to the number of NGO representatives that might counterbalance the overall structural 
power of industries. For the business conflict school model, the number of business 
representatives taking part to the negotiations is expected to be higher as business actors 
have to compete against each other to influence the policy process. The business 
conflict school model would also look at the different industrial sectors represented 
during the negotiations, a point neglected by the neo-gramscian framework. Though, 
both approaches elude the question of the origin of the firms involved in environmental 
negotiations. This point is crucial in order to understand the representativeness of 
business actors at the international level and will be scrutinised through our quantitative 
assessment of business participation. 
Secondly, both frameworks try to reflect on business lobbying strategies at the 
international level. Neo-gramscian scholars underline the strong links uniting business 
representatives to national governments.  On the contrary, the business conflict school 
model recognises that economic actors can interact directly in the negotiation processes. 
This point will have to be further analysed. In any case, both frameworks state that 
industries are fully aware of the negotiation processes and entirely devoted to 
influencing the debate. We will discuss this point by looking at the regularity of private 
sector actors’ participation to the CBD negotiations. 
Having evidenced these main research questions on business participation and 
business strategies, our analysis builds on a database of private sector representatives  
taking part to the CBD negotiations. We took down the institutional affiliation, the 
function, the country of origin as well as the industrial sector of each business 
participant to the negotiations. The analysis has been conducted for all the categories of 
CBD negotiations’ meetings. The Parties to the Convention meet every two years 
during Conferences of the Parties (COP) to take the main decisions regarding the 
convention’s activities2. Moreover, since 2004, the meetings of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol (COP-MOP) are organized back to back with these 
COP meetings. Before the adoption of the Protocol’s text, negotiations were taking 
place in biosafety working groups (BSWG and ExCOP meetings) and until its entry into 
force in intergovernmental committees (ICCP meetings). Specific questions have also 
regularly been discussed in expert group meetings (B-ExG). The access and benefit 
sharing negotiations have been following the same negotiation processes with working 
groups (WGABS meetings) and expert meetings (ABS-ExG). 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of the negotiation meetings constituting the database  
 
COP ICCP COP MOP BSWG 
Conference of 
the Parties 
Intergovernmental 
committee for the 
Conference of the Parties 
serving as a meeting for the 
Biosafety working 
groups 
                                                 
2 A methodological note at the end of the article explains in more details the origin of the data as well as 
the analysis conducted. Data were not available for the COP3 meeting. 
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Protocol Protocol 
1992-2008 2000-2002 2004-2008 1996-2000 
8 3 4 10 
 
 
 
Ex BS Ex ABS WGABS 
Biosafety expert 
groups 
Access and benefit 
sharing expert groups 
Working groups on access and 
benefit sharing 
2000-2008 1999-2007 2001-2008 
34 7 6 
 
The literature review on business power made above reveals that the quantitative 
results obtained from the database have to be considered and discussed carefully. 
Qualitative data -from a series of around 40 interviews with key state and non state 
actors in the CBD negotiations and participatory observations- are consequently added 
to the quantitative assessment in order to shed some lights on current trends in 
biodiversity negotiations. The next section of the article develops the nature of business 
representation in biodiversity negotiations (section 2a) and then analyses the strategies 
of private sector actors during the negotiations (section 2b).  
 
3 AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS PARTICIPATION AND 
BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
a. Importance of business participation to biodiversity negotiations 
This section aims at analysing the importance of business participation to 
biodiversity negotiations as well as the characteristics –sector and origin- of the firms 
taking part to the CBD’s meetings. 
Table 2 presents the participation of industry representatives in CBD meetings 
compared to NGOs, indigenous groups and government representatives’ involvement.  
 
Table 2. Non state actors’ comparative involvement in biodiversity governance 
(in percentage, compared to number of governmental delegates).  
 
Table 2 shows that a relatively small number of business participants have taken 
part to the CBD negotiation meetings. During the COP meetings, the private sector 
represents less than 4% of the number of governmental officials. The participation of 
ENGO’s is nearly ten times higher. The participation of business actors tend to be more 
important during expert group meetings. When looking at the involvement of business 
actors over time, we can also note that the number of private sector representatives 
taking part to the negotiation meetings grew with time, just as did the number of 
ENGO’s and indigenous’ peoples organisations. The progression of indigenous 
organisations is the most sticking feature when we look at the evolution of non-state 
actors’ participation to CBD meetings.  
A neo-gramscian interpretation of these results would lead us to conclude that 
business has a great power in biodiversity governance. Firms, protected by their 
 COP ICCP BSWG BS-ExG WGABS ABS-ExG 
ENGOs 29 17,74 12 4,3 11,25 3,1 
Indigenous 4,78 0 0 0 11,58 1,8 
Business 3,77 6,57 10,81 7,9 7,21 5,3 
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national governments, do not have to engage in lobbying while numerous ENGOs try to 
intervene as countervailing forces in the process. The power of business would be 
confirmed by the dominance of business actors in expert meetings. However, a further 
analysis of the reasons behind the low participation of business actors to the 
negotiations reveals that it can be explained by at least three factors.  
First of all, industry members became aware quite late of the biodiversity regime. 
At the beginning of the biosafety negotiations, the wide range of topics raised in the 
CBD meetings worked as a disincentive for business participation (Reifschneider, 2002). 
For most of the private sector representatives we interviewed, the initial indifference of 
business actors towards the CBD has been one of their main mistakes that later led to 
the adoption of a biosafety protocol in contradiction to biotechnology firms’ interests. 
Secondly, business actors are usually active on precise topics and only follow the 
negotiations that might have an impact of their activities. On the contrary, NGOs can 
pursue a much broader goal and be present at more meetings. Participation can be a 
potential risk for industries as they can become the preferential targets of environmental 
groups (interview with representative from CropLife International, 14/05/2008). Thirdly, 
business actors preferred to rely on their national delegations and decided not to 
participate directly in the negotiations (interview with European seed company, 
24/03/2006). The last two factors are compatible with a neo-gramscian perspective on 
business power in environmental governance. However, the third factor qualifies former 
claims on business “obvious” awareness and control of environmental issues. 
A second parameter of business participation to the CBD negotiations is linked 
to the industrial sectors represented at the international level. Table 3 illustrates the 
range of industrial sectors involved in the CBD negotiations. 
Table 3. Most significant industrial sectors represented in CBD meetings (in percentage, 
indicated for figures greater than 3%). 
 
The diversity of sectors represented is particularly relevant during Conferences 
of the Parties. Expert meetings or working group tend rather to gather sectors 
specialised in seed production, seed transportation and biotechnology for biosafety and 
seed production, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals for access and benefit sharing. 
Analysed carefully, the data tend to validate the business conflict school model. For 
biosafety, different firms positioned along the seeds production chain are present to the 
negotiations. For ABS, the companies taking part to the negotiations all have a specific 
use of genetic resources. Conflicts are likely to arise among these firms as they pursue 
different objectives. During COP meetings, environmental services companies are 
pushing for strong environmental norms while biotechnology companies favour low 
environmental standards. 
 COP COPMOP ICCP BSWG BS-ExG WGABS ABS-ExG 
Pharmaceuticals X X X 7 X 25 15 
Cosmetics 3 X X X X X X 
Environmental 
services 
4 X X X X 4 10 
Seeds 9 14 30 32 18 19 25 
Biotechnology 9 37 41 34 54 34 30 
Grain traders X 12 15 7 22 X X 
Oil 11 X X X X X X 
Consultancy 4 X 9 11 X X X 
Multi-sectors 22 23 X 3 X 11 10 
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Table 3 is important for the elements it illustrates but also for revealing the 
sectors that are surprisingly poorly involved in the negotiations. Natural products 
companies for instance are directly targeted by ABS regulations as they use innovations 
developed from natural resources as their main source of profit. Their absence in the 
CBD meetings can be explained by the highly political atmosphere of ABS meetings 
where claims of “biopiracy” 3  by NGOs and indigenous organisations are strong 
(interview with bioprospecting company, 21/03/2006). Moreover, several business 
activities are so much linked to national and local practices that it might also be difficult 
for firms to find a common interest in collective action at the international level. 
A third characteristic of business participation to CBD meetings relates to the 
origin of business representatives. Table 4 illustrates the country of origin of business 
actors taking part to CBD meetings. Whereas former approaches on business power 
tended to neglect this dimension of business participation, the analysis of business 
origin reveals several trends in business representation at the international level. 
By considering the overall proportion of business representatives according to 
their origin, we can observe the dominance of North American companies –from 
Canada and the United States- in biodiversity negotiations. This proportion questions 
the usual claims of all major business associations that assert to be highly representative 
of the entire business community. For instance, the Global Industry Coalition, the main 
business coalition involved in the biosafety negotiations, claims to represent more than 
2200 members in 130 countries worldwide while the private sector representatives 
registering under its name mostly come from North America. 
Table 4. Percentage of industry representatives by country of origin 
 
  
After North America, developed countries –Belgium, Denmark, Japan, United 
Kingdom, etc.- are overrepresented.  The figures also demonstrate the importance of the 
meetings’ venue in determining companies’ attendance. For instance, 82% of business 
                                                 
3 That is to say the misappropriation of natural resources and/or traditional knowledge. 
 COP COPMOP ICCP BSWG BS-ExG WGABS ABS-ExG
Belgium 6 9 5 8 13 11 X 
Brazil 25 32 X X X 7 X 
Canada 4 6 9 19 12 6 17 
Denmark 0 0 X X X X 17 
Germany 13 6 5 3 X X 11 
Japan 7 0 X X X 11 11 
Malaysia 6 0 X X X X X 
Mexico 0 4 3 4 3 X X 
Netherlands 6 X 9 4 3 6 6 
Pakistan X X X X X X 6 
South Africa X X 3 X X X X 
Spain X X  X X 7 X 
Sweden X X 3 X X X X 
Switzerland 5 X 6 4 X 10 6 
United 
Kingdom 
6 X 5 X 4 3 X 
United States 12 26 37 49 44 35 28 
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representatives taking part to the COP 8 meeting in Brazil came from this country. 
Table 5 illustrates the figures obtained if we eliminate this distortion for COP meetings. 
 
Table 5. Percentage of industry representatives by country of origin, excluding COP 
host country.  
 
 
In Table 5, the dominance of North American companies in the negotiation 
process is even clearer. This point raises a characteristic that has been somehow 
neglected by former studies on business participation, that is to say that participation 
can be an issue for industry representatives as well. Participation indeed means 
possessing the required skills to follow the main points of the negotiations. Most 
industry representatives taking part to CBD meetings explained they had to convince 
their own company to participate in meetings, as such participation requires financial 
support and time. A wide range of international negotiations, of which the biodiversity 
discussions are just one example, can have potential impacts on the economic activities 
of industries. This reduces their capacities to participate in negotiation meetings –
especially in the case of small and medium size companies or firms from developing 
countries- and result in the main mobilisation of political, powerful lobbying coalitions 
from developed countries.  
Moreover, the participation of developing countries’ companies is sometimes 
manipulated by transnational corporations. For instance, Monsanto, the firm that has 
been the most virulently criticised for its stubbornness during the negotiations of the 
Cartagena Protocol, sent two representatives from South Africa and Kenya to the ICCP2 
meeting, after the adoption of the protocol’s text, in order to reinforce its legitimacy. 
When looking at the evolution of business representation during COP meetings, 
Table 5 reveals that business representativeness is improving over time. The first COP 
was attended only by Dutch, English and American companies. Nowadays Brazilian 
 COP1 COP2 COP4 COP5 COP6 COP7 COP8 COP9 
Belgium X 6 X 17 X 19 12 12 
Brazil X X X X 13 6 XXX 5 
Canada X 31 32 17 7 13 8 X 
China X X X X X 6 X X 
Colombia X X X X X X 4 X 
Denmark 9 X X X X X X X 
Finland X X X X 7 X X X 
France X X X X 7 X X X 
Germany X X 5 8 X X X XXX 
Japan X X X X 7 19 X 20 
México X X X 8 X X X X 
Netherlands X X X X XXX 13 12 6 
Norway X X X X X X 4 X 
Peru X X X X X X 4 X 
Switzerland X X 11 8 7 6 8 11 
United 
Kingdom 
27 19 21 25 7 6 12 6 
United States 64 44 32 17 47 13 31 9 
Zimbabwe X X X X X X 4 X 
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companies’ participation is a sign of a better participation of developing countries. The 
article now turns to the analysis of business strategies in environmental regimes. 
 
b. Firms as political actors in biodiversity governance 
Several options exist for industry representatives to take part to international 
negotiations: they might ask to be involved as observers or to be integrated in national 
delegations. In both cases they can choose to participate as a firm or as a member of an 
industrial association. Associations are indeed perceived by non state actors as been the 
most adequate structures to attract the attention of delegates.  
We have seen in the first part of the article that, for neo-gramscian scholars, 
business actors are believed to be taking part to national delegations. In particular, 
“revolving doors” are an illustrative phenomenon of the strong links that unite business 
and governmental officials in their common interest for flexible environmental 
regulations. Though, Table 6 helps us to qualify the overall importance of business 
representation in national delegations. In nearly all categories of meetings, less than 
10% of private sector actors taking part to the negotiations are integrated in national 
delegations. The ABS-ExG groups are the only exception to this ratio with as many 
business actors involved in national delegations as in direct action. However, expert 
groups usually accept a limited number of observers. This can partially explain why the 
proportion of business actors in delegations is, in comparison, higher.  
Table 6. Percentage of private sector representatives’ institutional affiliation  
 
National delegations to CBD meetings are mostly composed by environmental, 
development and agriculture ministries. In some cases, the participation of private 
sector actors to national delegations is balanced by the presence of NGOs (Rosendal, 
2006, p.272). These elements reinforce the loose relationship between national 
delegations and industrial interests. Moreover, the presence of private actors in 
delegations is not necessarily a sign of poor environmental awareness but can reveal 
some particularly strong national legislation related to the CBD’s objectives. For 
instance, the Brazilian delegation to ABS meetings comprises members from Brazilian 
cosmetic firms such as Natura. In 2003, the Brazilian government put in place a binding 
ABS legislation involving all stakeholders in decision-making related to the access to 
Brazilian natural genetic resources. Nowadays, Brazilian firms are therefore promoting 
the adoption of these binding rules at the international level. 
“Revolving doors” are relatively rare in biodiversity negotiations. In line with 
the neo-gramscian argument, they mark some important turns in the negotiations. For 
instance, our interviews and observations revealed that Val Giddings, who used to be in 
the American delegation, joined the business community during the Cartagena Protocol 
negotiations in order to create the first international business coalition dedicated to 
biosafety: the Global Industry Coalition. Alwin Kopse, a former Swiss delegate at the 
initiative of the voluntary Bonn guidelines for access to genetic resources that were 
adopted by the Parties to the Convention in 2001, joined the International Chamber of 
 COP COPMOP ICCP BSWG BS-
ExG 
WGABS ABS-
ExG 
Association 47 78 59 51 79 61 20 
National 
delegation 
8 13 5 8 9 18 50 
Individual 
company 
45 9 36 41 12 21 30 
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Commerce task force on ABS just after the adoption of Bonn agreement. In both cases, 
these individuals were advocating flexible international standards. 
Table 6 illustrates that the main channel of influence favoured by business actors 
relies on business associations. When screening the name of the organisations involved 
in biodiversity negotiations –the Pharmaceuticals Researchers and Manufacturers of 
America, EuropaBio, the International Chamber of Commerce, etc.- it becomes visible 
that these associations are not specifically dedicated to biodiversity governance. They 
mostly consist in professional coalitions that are usually representing business in 
commercial negotiations. These groups are therefore poorly specialised in 
environmental negotiations. 
Finally, a few companies prefer to participate individually to the meetings. This 
underlines that collective action is not necessarily easy for business representatives that 
might be competitors. It can also signal the preference of certain groups to remain 
differentiated from their homologues. For instance, Novo Nordisk, a Dutch 
biotechnology company specialised in enzymes was the only company not joining the 
Biotechnology Industry Organisation initiative during the Cartagena protocol 
negotiations and did not join the Global Industry Coalition later on. This is due to its 
particular interest in biodiversity and a moderate corporate policy4. On the contrary, 
Monsanto deliberately lobbied for its own interests and periodically sent its own 
representatives to the negotiations. After the elaboration of the protocol text that 
represented a great failure for the biotechnology company, the strategy of the firm 
changed and Monsanto became mainly represented through the International Chamber 
of Commerce -or by southern representatives as noticed above.  
 
Private sector actors’ presence in meetings is one aspect of business involvement 
in negotiations. Environmental negotiations are however well known to be complex and 
to gather a great number of different interests and actors (Chasek, 2001). In such a 
complex environment, the experience participants have of former negotiations can make 
a great difference for the progress of the debates (Tolba & Rummel-Bulska, 1998; 
Chasek, 2001; Depledge, 2006). This is one aspect of business participation that has 
been poorly studied so far.  
The tables 7 to 9 present the number of CBD meetings attended by each private 
sector representative. The data illustrates that very few private sector actors followed 
more than one negotiation meeting. 
 Table 7. Number of CBD meetings attended by each business representative 
 
Table 8. Number of biosafety meetings attended by each business representative 
 
                                                 
4 In ABS governance, Novo Nordisk was the first company to establish guidelines on the access to 
genetic resources. See also (Frein & Meyer, 2008, p.157). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-10 11-20 More than 
20 
Number of business 
representatives 
633 96 30 20 12 8 12 11 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-10 More than 10 
Number of 
business 
representatives 
270 46 15 13 9 5 12 5 
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Table 9. Number of working group on access and benefit sharing attended by 
each business representative 
 
 
 
 
 
When looking at percentages, the number of private sector representatives 
attending only one CBD meeting represents more than ¾ of private sector actors. This 
lack of continuity in the participation of business representatives can be explained by 
their lack of understanding of the negotiation process. For instance, most private sector 
participants to the ABSWG4 meeting were heavily surprised by the uncertainty 
surrounding the status of a draft proposal for an international regime elaborated and 
proposed by the Parties to the African group. Most industry representatives were 
complaining about the lack of clarity of the negotiation process compared to the one of 
trade negotiations that they usually attend.  
However, the tables 7 to 9 also demonstrate that a handful of individuals have 
been highly involved in CBD meetings. These individuals’ presence has been crucial in 
organising private sectors’ actions in biodiversity governance. Laura Reifschneider that 
attended 29 CBD meetings explains how she took part to the formation of a business 
coalition under the banner of the Biotechnology industry Organisation (BIO) during the 
Cartagena protocol negotiations (Reifschneider, 2002). Val Giddings, vice president of 
BIO that attended 11 CBD meetings has been pointed by several interviewees as the 
“founding father” of the Global Industry Coalition, one of the most powerful business 
coalitions in the Cartagena Protocol negotiations.  
The creation, evolution and strategies of lobbying groups in biodiversity 
governance such as the Global Industry Coalition or the Bioindustry Organisation (BIO), 
have been mentioned in the literature as a sign of strong business coordination during 
the negotiations (Clapp, 2007). Our analysis reveals that these coalitions rely on a 
limited number of active participants. In practice and as already mentioned, business 
participants continue to favour other kind of representation –such as individual 
involvement. A deeper analysis of the way business international coalitions function 
reveals that their main role consist in information sharing and socialisation (Bled, 
2009b). The Global Industry Coalition has mainly been the results of the efforts of a 
handful of North-American representatives particularly opposed to the Cartagena 
Protocol (interview with European seed company, 24/03/2006). The relatively low 
strategic role of business coalitions in the biodiversity political arena is confirmed by 
the common objective among private sector representatives to lobby in priority for their 
own companies. 
 
4 CONCLUSION: CALLING FOR FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
ON BUSINESS PARTICIPATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 
The quantitative analysis of private sector representatives’ involvement in the 
CBD negotiations conducted in this article helps us to understand the way business 
organises when confronted to international environmental policy-making. Our starting 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of business 
representatives 
43 9 8 4 2 
  
88
point was to elaborate on theoretical assumptions on business participation to 
environmental regimes in order to detail the modalities of such participation.  
The neo-gramscian interpretation of business power in international negotiations 
is only partially validated by our analysis. While business actors are to some extent 
included in national delegations, several signs are qualifying their overall influence in 
the policy process. In particular, the high number of business representatives 
participating as observers, the broad range of business sectors represented and the low 
involvement of private sector actors contradict the vision of business actors as obvious 
political actors. Some of these elements –such as the broad range of industrial sectors 
represented but also the multiple origins of the firms- tend to rather validate the 
business conflict school model.  
However, the analysis also illustrates several new aspects of business 
participation to environmental regimes that have been somehow neglected by former 
studies. The article highlights the fact that business actors are mainly affiliated to North-
American associations. This element tackles the issue of developing countries and small 
and medium size companies’ capacities to intervene in the negotiations process. The 
results also show the lack of involvement of private sector actors, which mobilisation 
mainly relies on a handful of individuals, mostly opposed to environmental regulations. 
Business associations taking part to the CBD meetings are poorly specialised in 
environmental issues. 
This trend might be subject to changes as the awareness of private sector actors 
towards biodiversity governance is improving. Current efforts by the Parties to the 
Convention are oriented towards the further involvement of all private sector 
representatives in CBD activities. These efforts translated during COP8 in a new 
decision, decision VIII/17, furthering business involvement in the activities of the 
biodiversity Convention (Bled, 2009a). The example of Brazilian companies’ 
participation to the negotiations as well as their integration in their national delegation is 
another sign for potential change. 
In relation to the academic debate on business power in environmental 
governance, our study calls for a better empirical analysis of firms’ participation to 
environmental regimes. Such analyses will have to picture more precisely the broad 
diversity of business actors involved in the debate. The issue of the firm as a political 
actor will also have to be questioned. In order to do so, the empirical scrutiny of 
business coalitions’ function could be an important step forward.  
Note on the methodology used for the data analysis 
In order to conduct the quantitative assessment that serves as a basis for this article, the 
author gathered all the lists of participants to the CBD meetings. Several of these lists 
were made available by the CBD Secretariat and the remaining lists were collected by 
the author by the archives of Ecoropa, a German environmental non governmental 
organization that followed the CBD negotiations, as well as among the documents of 
Hartmut Meyer, an expert on biosafety issues. 
The author then identified on these lists all the private sector representatives that took 
part to the CBD negotiations. For each negotiation meeting, the characteristics of all 
business representatives – their origin, industrial sector and affiliation - have then been 
coded by the author in order to carry out a statistical analysis of their content.  
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